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REGULATION BY EXEMPTION:
THE CHANGING DEFINITION OF AN ACCREDITED
INVESTOR
RobertaS. Karmel*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has preserved its
jurisdictional grip and ideological purity with respect to the regulation of
initial public offerings and the regulation of mutual funds by creating huge
exemptions from its regulatory scheme. While these exemptions have been in
response to push backs against a rigid and complex framework for the
registration of public offerings and the governance of mutual funds, it has led
to anomalies in the capital markets, arguably not in the interests of the retail
investors the SEC endeavors to protect. The SEC exemptions have been
achieved through the use of the "accredited investor" concept, injected into
the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") in 1980 by a Congress
impatient with the SEC's refusal to be more flexible in its interpretation of
the private offering exemption.' This statutory amendment led to the
2
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* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block
Center for the Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School.
She is a former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission. A research
stipend from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance in the preparation of this article. The
author also thanks Brooklyn Law School student Bradley Scott Szu-Tu for his assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(15), 77d(6) (2000). The stated purpose for this amendment
was "Congressional concern that small businesses should have an adequate market to raise
capital and that investors should not be unnecessarily impeded from purchasing securities of
small businesses." S. REP. No. 96-958, at 45 (1980).
2. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2008).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2008).
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and the passage of time, but recent proposals by the SEC to put a brake on
the enormous private placement market that Regulation D and some related
regulations spawned has been resisted by retail and other investors.4 Part II
of this article will explain the background to the promulgation of Regulation
D and related rules, set forth the changes in the marketplace wrought by
these regulations, and raise some questions as to how the SEC should
respond to these developments in today's market climate.
A similar response to objections by foreign investors 5 to their problems
with the SEC's Securities Act registration provisions 6 led to the development
of another private placement exemption, Rule 144A. 7 More recently, the
SEC has dealt with these problems by relieving foreign issuers of the need to
reconcile their financial statements to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP"), 8 but the vigor of the exempt offshore market makes it
questionable whether this change in the regulations for registered offerings
will attract foreign investors who have been making offerings in the Rule
144A private placement market. These matters will be discussed in Part II of
this article.
The U.S. system for the regulation of collective investment funds
pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company
Act") 9 is at odds with the regulation of such funds elsewhere, 0 but the SEC
has found this regulatory system conducive to its views on corporate
governance. Investors and fund managers have been less enamored of the
complex regulation of funds in a corporate form with controls on leverage
and advisor compensation. Since some forms of collective investment funds
are exempt from SEC registration and regulation, these exempt pools-in the
form of hedge funds and private equity funds-have grown exponentially in
4. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act
Release No. 3235, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,922, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (Aug.
10, 2007) [hereinafter Regulation D Amendment Proposals].
5. Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes To Method of Determining Holding Period
of Restricted Securities under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6806, 53 Fed.
Reg. 44,016, 44,020-44,023 (Nov. 1, 1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230).
6. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
7. 17 C.F.R. §230.144A (2008).
8. See Acceptance From Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards without Reconciliation to U.S.
GAAP, Securities Act Release No. 8879, Exchange Act Release No. 57,026 (December 21,
2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 230, 239 and 249).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000).
10. See Div. OF INV. MGMT., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF
CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 202-03 (1992)
[hereinafter SEC,
PROTECTING INVESTORS].
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recent years.'1 Although the SEC has attempted to limit its long standing
exemption of hedge funds from regulation under either the Investment
Company Act or the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Investment Advisers
Act"), 12 this attempt was thwarted by a decision of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.' 3 The SEC has gone back to the drawing
boards and attempted to fashion some different regulations aimed at closing
the loophole in its coverage of collective investment funds, in part by
proposing new "accredited investor" type definitions. 14 Part III of this Article
will discuss these developments and suggest that a better approach would be
a wholesale revision of the Investment Company Act.
Very generally, an accredited investor is an investor who is sufficiently
sophisticated so as not to need the protections of the federal securities laws,
but such an investor generally is defined in terms of wealth, on the theory
that an accredited investor can hire knowledgeable and sophisticated
advisors. 15 Finding this concept a useful way of dealing with claims of overregulation, the SEC has fashioned a large number of accredited investor
definitions for the purpose of structuring exemptions from the securities
laws. The Securities Act currently defines "accredited investor" to mean: an
insurance company, a registered Investment Company, a business
development company, a Small Business Investment Company, or an
employee benefit plan (all with certain qualifications); or "any person who,
on the basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge,
and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under management
qualifies as an accredited investor under rules and regulations which the
Commission shall prescribe."' 16 This definition was intended to loosen the
extremely restrictive interpretations of the private offering exemption in the
the SEC, so as to ease the capital
Securities Act by some circuit courts and
7
business.
small
on
put
raising burdens
The SEC's subsequent definition of "accredited investor" in Regulation
D, the regulation interpreting the private offering exemption, was an
important step in legitimizing the private placement market. This definition
provides that the term "accredited investor" is any person within certain
categories, namely:
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 80b (2000).
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 36-45.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2000).
See infra notes 33-35.
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(1) any bank [or other enumerated financial institution or pension fund with
assets in excess of $5,000,000]; (2) any private business development
company ... (3) any [501(c)(3) organization] with total assets in excess of
$5,000,000; (4) any director, executive officer or general partner of the issuer
[or of the general partner of the issuer] of the securities being offered and
sold... (5) any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth
with that person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000; (6)
[a]ny natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in
each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse
in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation
of reaching the same income level in the current year; (7) [a]ny trust, with
total assets in excess of $5,000,000 ... and
(8) [a]ny entity in which all of
18
the equity owners are accredited investors.
As a result of the breadth of this definition, and in particular the
inclusion of pension funds and individuals who were sufficiently wealthy in
the accredited investor definition, the private placement market then grew
dramatically over the years.19 Also, in 1996, the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act ("NSMIA") amended the Securities Act to pre-empt the
power of the states to require registration of "covered securities"-basically
securities traded on a national securities exchange-and this statute included
an exemption for the sale of covered securities to "qualified purchasers. 2 °
Recently, in recognition of some of the problems that time has wrought with
respect to the accredited investor definition, the SEC has proposed revisions
to the accredited investor definition
and also proposed a new category of the
21
"large accredited investor."
In the meantime, in response to demands by foreign issuers for an
exemption from the Securities Act registration provisions when selling to
institutional investors, the SEC developed Rule 144A, which allowed
offerings to "qualified institutional buyers" generally defined as financial
institutions that own more than $100 million worth of securities of
unaffiliated issuers, and in the case of banks and savings and loan
associations, has a net worth of at least $25 million.22 This exemption led to
18. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2008).
19. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
20. 15 U.S.C. §18 (2000). This statute did not particularly assist small issuers. See
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of NSMIA on Small Issuers, 53 Bus. LAW. 575, 581
(1998).
21. Regulation D Amendment Proposals, supra note 4.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(7)(a)(l) (2008).
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the growth of a very large market for Rule 144A stocks, obviating the need
for many foreign issuers to become registered and reporting companies under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").23
In its efforts to revise its prior policies exempting hedge funds from
regulation as either investment advisers or investment companies, the SEC
also made use of the accredited investor concept. After failing to have a new
rule re-defining the term "client" for purposes of the Investment Advisers
Act upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Goldstein,24 the SEC has proposed a
definition of an "accredited natural person" to restrict the investors who
would qualify to invest in certain private pooled investment vehicles. 25
Previously, for purposes of defining clients who may want to use
performance fees in the management of client assets, the SEC
defined the
26
term "qualified purchaser" under the Investment Advisers Act.
While each of these definitions may be for a different purpose in creating
different exemptions from the securities laws, there is a certain intellectual
incoherence in the proposal of so many different definitions for the same
basic idea of an investor who does not need the protections of the securities
laws and wishes to invest with a greater freedom than the SEC normally
allows. This is far from principles-based regulation, but rather, it is
bureaucratic rule-making that attempts to protect the SEC's regulatory
jurisdiction in the face of opponents of the SEC's controls on access to
capital and money management.

23. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000). Any foreign issuer with $10 million in assets and 300 U.S.
shareholders out of 500 shareholders is required to register under Section 12 of the Exchange
Act but can apply for an exemption under Rule 12g-3(2)(b) if the issuer does not make a
public offering in the United States or list on a U.S. securities exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 781
(2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2008). Rule 144A thus obviates the need for Exchange
Act registration for any issuer who wishes to tap U.S. investors but not become a registered
and reporting company.
24. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
25. See Prohibition of Fraud by Advisors to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 8766,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2576, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (Jan. 4, 2007) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. §§ 230 and 275).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1) (2008); Defining the Term "Qualified Purchaser"
Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 8041, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,839 (Dec.
27, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230).
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II. THE ACCREDITED INVESTOR IN PRIVATE PLACEMENTS

Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts "transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering. 27 Congress included this exemption to avoid
SEC registration requirements in situations involving isolated sales of
securities or sales where there was no practical need for the Act's
application. 28 In an early interpretation, the SEC found that an offering to
thirty-five purchasers could not qualify for the private placement
exemption.29 In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,30 the Supreme Court held that
the number of purchasers is not determinative; rather, what matters is the
investor's ability to fend for himself and have access to the kind of
information that would be included in a registration statement. 31 Further, the
burden of demonstrating the availability of the exemption is put on the
32
person claiming it.
Some very restrictive interpretations of the private
placement exemption in the Fifth Circuit led to the doctrines that all offerees
must receive the same information a registration statement would provide,
and must be sufficiently knowledgeable and sophisticated to assess such
information.33
These interpretations made it very difficult for promoters to make private
placements, and led to calls for reform by small businesses and their lawyers
and other advisors. The SEC then promulgated Rule 146 under the Securities
Act of 1933, attempting to achieve some objectivity with regard to the
private placement exemption, and this rule for the first time put forward the
concept of an accredited investor as a person who was wealthy or who had
an offeree representative.3 4 The small business lobby, dissatisfied with the
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000).
28. See Wright v. Nat'l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256, 259-60 (6th Cir. 1992).
29. Letter of General Counsel Discussing the Factors to be Considered in Determining
the Availability of the Exemption from Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section
4(1), Securities Act Release No. 285, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
2,740-2,744 (Jan. 24, 1935).
30. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
31. Id.at 126-27.
32. See, e.g., Mary S. Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments, 642 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1981).
33. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Cont'l
Tobacco Co. of S.C., Inc., 463 F.2d 137, 160 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v. Hayden, Stone,
Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680 (5th Cir. 1971).
34. Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933-"Transactions
by an Issuer Deemed not to Involve any Public Offering," Securities Act Release No. 5487, 4
SEC Docket 154 (Apr. 23, 1974). Rule 146 was one of the rules promulgated in response to
the Wheat Report, a study by an SEC commissioner urging that Securities Act exemptions be
rationalized and made more objective. FRANcIs M. WHEAT, SEC. & ExcH. COMM'N,
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pace of the SEC's reform of the private placement exemption then persuaded
Congress to add section 4(6) to the Securities Act, prodding the SEC to
further define an accredited investor and loosen the restrictions on private
placements.35
The SEC's response was the promulgation of Regulation D, which set
forth a definition of the "accredited investor" for a series of private
placement exemptions. 36 The most important of these rules probably is Rule
506, which allows private placements without any limit on the aggregate
offering price to no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors and any
number of accredited investors. 37 Although certain specified financial
information must be provided to purchasers who are not accredited, for
accredited investors, access to information, rather than information as
extensive as a prospectus in a registration statement is required.38 Very
importantly, liability for fraud in a Regulation D placement is pursuant to
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 under the Exchange Act rather than under
Section 11 of the Securities Act. 39 In addition to including various financial
institutions, and an issuer's officers and directors, within the definition of an
accredited investor, the Regulation D definition includes:
[A]ny natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that
person's spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000 [and] any
natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each
of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse in

DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS:
'34
SECURITIES

A

REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND
ACTS
(1969),
available
at

http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1960/1969_Wheat.
35. S. REP. No. 96-958, supra note 1, at 44. See also Mark A. Sargent, The New
Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH.

U. L.Q. 225 (1990).
36. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (2008).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2008).
39. Section 11 of the Securities Act applies only to registered, not exempt offerings. 15
U.S.C. § 77k (2000). The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 12 of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 771 (2000), also to apply to public, not private offerings. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,
513 U.S. 561 (1995). There is no private right of action under Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000); see MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW §
904[C] (4th ed. 2007). Accordingly, a defrauded purchaser in a private action must prove a
case under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act which, among other things, requires proof of
scienter. See STEINBERG, at § 8.01.
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excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a 4reasonable expectation
of reaching the same income level in the current year. 0
Not only are Regulation D private placements exempt from SEC registration
under the Securities Act, but sales to "qualified purchasers" of "covered
securities" are pre-empted from regulation by state securities commissions.4!
The private placement exemption is a transaction exemption for issuers.
In order to make this a meaningful exemption, it was necessary for the SEC
to create a regulation for resales of securities purchased in a private
placement for investment and not with a view to distribution, 42 an
undertaking every purchaser in a private placement must make in order to
avoid violating the registration provisions of the Securities Act. 43 The SEC
did so by promulgating Rule 144, defining certain types of resales made after
a set holding period not to be distributions of securities. 44 This rule initially
imposed a two year holding period on purchasers in private placements, but
the rule has been liberalized over the years, and recently the SEC shortened
the holding period for private placement purchasers to six months, and
further loosened restrictions of the rule.45
The success of Regulation D and Rule 144 led the SEC to adopt Rule
144A in 1990 in order to provide a safe harbor exemption from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act for resales of securities sold in
private placements to "qualified institutional buyers. 4 6 The SEC regarded
this rule as a step in achieving a more liquid and efficient institutional resale
40. 17 C.F.R. § 2230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2008).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3)-(4)(D) (2000).
42. In order not to be an underwriter under Section 2(a)(1 1) of the Securities Act, a
purchaser in a private placement must take for investment and not "with a view to ...
distribution." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l 1) (2000).
43. Section 4(1) of the Securities Act provides an exemption from any seller who is not
an issuer, underwriter or dealer. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (2000). If a purchaser in a private
placement did not take for investment and hold the purchased securities for some length of
time, the purchaser would be an "underwriter" and therefore violate the law. See Gilligan,
Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
44. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2008); Notice of Adoption of Rule 144 Relating to the
Definition of the Terms "Underwriter" in Sections 4(1) and 2(11) and "Brokers' Transactions"
in Section 4(4) of the Securities Act of 1933, Adoption of Form 144, and Rescission of Rules
154 and 155 Under That Act, Securities Act Release No. 5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 78,487 (Jan. 11, 1972). This rule also was a response to the Wheat
Report. WHEAT, supra note 34.
45. Revisions to Rule 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 8869, 72 Fed. Reg.
71,546 (Dec. 17, 2007).
46. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008).
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market for unregistered securities, particularly foreign securities. 47 Although
the Rule 144A market grew slowly at first, it is now a robust sector of the
global marketplace.
As a result of Regulation D and Rule 144, the private placement market
in the United States grew quickly. After Regulation D was passed, the total
amount of securities sold in private placements increased from $18 billion in
1981 to $139 billion in 1987 and then to $202 billion in 1988.48 Further,
there was a broadening in the type of institutional investor buying in this
market.49 Over the next two decades, in part because of the growth in Rule
144A offerings, this market became even bigger. In 2006, the total capital
raised through Rule 144A deals was greater than the amount raised on the
American Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ and the New York Stock
Exchange combined.50 According to NASDAQ, the amount of equity and
debt capital raised using Rule 144A exceeded $1 trillion in 2006, and in the
first half of 2007, global equity and debt capital raised in Rule 144A
offerings was almost $1 trillion, a 43% increase over the year before.5 '
Recently, NASDAQ has announced that a group of securities firms and
NASDAQ intend to form The PORTAL Alliance, an industry standard
facility designed to serve the market for 144A equity securities, which
should serve to further develop this market. 2
Although the SEC's facilitation of the growth of the private placement
and 144A markets can be applauded, it probably has led to the increased
institutionalization of the markets, possibly to the detriment of retail

47. See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding
Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 6862,
Exchange Act Release No. 27,928, Investment Company Act Release No. 17,452, 55 Fed.
Reg. 17,933 (Apr. 23, 1990).
48. Kellye Y. Testy, The Capital Markets in Transition:A Response to New SEC Rule
144A, 66 IND. L.J. 233, 242 (1990).
49. Id.
50. Lynn Cowan, Banks to Share Platform for 144A Trades, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12,
2007, at C3; Public Versus PrivateEquity Markets - Is the Growth of PrivatePlacements at
the Expense of Public Equity Offerings in the US a Temporary Phenomenon or Does it Signal
a More Significant Shift Away from Public Scrutiny?, THE BANKER, Sept. 1, 2007.
51. NASDAQ's Electronic Platform for the 144A Private Placement Market Begins
Operation,PrimeNewsWire, Aug. 15, 2007.
52. Cowan, supra note 50. The value of equity raised by foreign companies through
144A issues grew from $2.3 billion in 2003 to $5.5 billion in 2007. Peter Thai Larsen, Facts
and Figures:Non-US Companies Exploit Rule 144A, FIN. TIMES, June 24, 2008, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/sO/12e5e9ee-3f43-11 dd-8fd9-0000779fd2ac.html.
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investors. 3 Another route, which the SEC did not take, instead of creating
huge exemptions from Securities Act registration, would have been to reform
the registration provisions to make them more attractive to both domestic and
foreign issuers. But the SEC has made these provisions ever more complex,
and its reforms of the offering provisions, for example, are geared to helping
large, world class issuers rather than smaller issuers. 54 Should the SEC
continue to regulate by exemption in this fashion rather than alter its
regulations so they are more user-friendly? What is the effect on retail
investors who are unable to access private placements? Further, are the
"accredited investor" definitions outdated so that some retail investors who
are not really
so rich or sophisticated are participating in private
55
placements?
Rather belatedly, the SEC seems to have recognized the wealth
definitions enacted in 1982 have been superseded by inflation and has
proposed that these definitions be indexed to inflation going forward."
Further, the SEC has proposed a new definition of a "large accredited
investor" with significantly higher dollar amount thresholds which would
enable promoters to engage in limited advertising of private placements.
Legal entities that are considered accredited investors if their assets exceeded
$5 million would be required to have $10 million in investments to qualify as
large accredited investors. Individuals generally would be required to own
$2.5 million in investments or have an annual income of $400,000 or
$600,000 with a spouse to so qualify.5 7 This is exactly the kind of regulation
by exemption which is problematic. The SEC's offering rules which restrict
advertising are completely outmoded and should be repealed and replaced by
regulations that prohibit fraud in the offer of securities, rather than
Staff:

53. See Brian G. Cartwright, General Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC
The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007) available at

www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm (discussing the "de-retailization" of the
securities markets).
54. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act
Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug.
3, 2005). The so-called "Aircraft Carrier" proposals which preceded the Offering Reform
Rules were so complicated and prolix they fell of their own weight. See The Regulation of
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A, Exchange Act Release No. 40,632A,
Investment Company Act Release No. 23,519A (proposed Nov. 17, 1998); see also EDWARD
F. GREENE, U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS §

2.04 n.151 (7th ed. 2004).
55. See Marc Steinberg, The "Accredited" Individual Purchaser Under Regulation D:
Time to Up the Ante, 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 93, 95-96 (2001).
56. Regulation D Amendment Proposals, supra note 4.
57. Id.
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continuing to prohibit so-called "gun jumping" or public solicitation of
private placements. 58 Yet, the SEC persists in clinging to old forms of its
regulations instead of confronting the need for reform and has been able to
do so by fashioning exemptions for those who complain that these
regulations are impeding capital formation or U.S. market competitiveness.
III. THE HEDGE FUND EXEMPTION

For many years, hedge funds were exempt from SEC registration more
through neglect than by intention. Functionally, a hedge fund or private
equity fund is no different from a mutual fund in that all three vehicles are
pooled investment funds managed by an investment adviser. A mutual fund
generally is a public vehicle, regulated under the Investment Company Act,
which forces the fund to operate as a corporation, advised by a separate
entity, while a hedge fund or private equity fund generally is a limited
partnership managed by a general partner, which has not made a public
offering.59
Mutual funds are required to register with the SEC pursuant to the
Investment Company Act, 60 in addition to having to register a public offering
of their shares pursuant to the Securities Act.6' Once registered, the
Investment Company Act requires that 40% of the board be "independent" or
"disinterested." 62 Interested directors are defined to include a long list of
persons who have some business or professional relationship with the
investment company or are affiliated with the adviser, underwriter or broker
for the investment company. 63 The investment company's independent
directors are given special statutory responsibilities with regard to the
58. See, e.g., Eric Chiappinelli, Gun Jumping: The Problem of Extraneous Offers of
Securities, 50 U. PITr. L. REV.457 (1989); Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General
Solicitation, 38 EMORY L.J. 67, 103-22 (1989); see also, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER
PUBLIC COMPANIES, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

5 (Apr. 23, 2006).
59. See SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 10, at 252.
60. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (2000).
61. Securities Act 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
62. Section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act requires that a registered investment
company's board of directors may not consist of more than 60% "interested" persons. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000). The SEC has mandated that more than 50% of an investment
company board be composed of independent directors and has proposed that boards have a
super majority of 75% independent directors. See infra notes 72-73.
63. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000).
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supervision of management and financial auditing. In particular, they have
the duty of reviewing and approving the contracts of the
investment company
64
with its investment adviser and principal underwriter.
Congress placed the disinterested directors in the role of independent
watchdogs to act as a check on the management of the investment company.
Therefore, even where state rather than federal law determines a conflict of
interest issue such as the dismissal of a derivative suit, the policies of the
Investment Company Act must be taken into consideration. 65 Yet, because an
investment company is the creature of its sponsor/adviser, there have been
persistent questions as to whether independent directors can provide effective
oversight of the contractual relationship between the fund and the adviser. 66
Although the fund's directors can and do perform a watchdog function, they
do not function like directors of an industrial or financial services company,
participating in decisions about the fund's strategy or investment activities.
Fund boards do not and cannot supervise the business and management of
the firms that manage fund assets or distribute and market fund shares.
Furthermore, investors care about the overall performance of the fund more
than they care about the corporate governance of the fund. The SEC,
however, has found its supervision of mutual funds a good vehicle for
articulating its general views on corporate governance.67
The SEC has accomplished its corporate governance experiments over
the years by conditioning a number of exemptive rules under the Investment
Company Act upon review and approval by independent investment
company directors. Because the Investment Company Act contains numerous
sweeping prohibitions against transactions with affiliated entities which are,
in fact, commonplace, reliance on these exemptive rules are necessary to
permit investment companies to conduct business in many situations. The
most important of these exemptions permit funds to purchase securities in a
primary offering where an affiliated broker dealer is a member of the
68
thuso
underwriting syndicate, permit the use of fund assets to pay distribution
expenses, 69 permit securities transactions between a fund and another client

64. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000).
65. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 479 (1979).
66. SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 10, at 264-66.
67. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 79 (2005) (discussing the SEC's corporate governance agenda).
68. Rule 10f-3, 17 C.F.R. § 270.10f-3 (2008).
69. Rule 12b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2008).
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of the fund investment adviser 70 and specify conditions under which funds
may pay commissions to 7affiliated brokers in connection with the sale of
securities on an exchange. 1
During the past few years the SEC has forced mutual funds to have
boards of a majority of independent directors, rather than the 40% standard
mandated by the Investment Company Act by conditioning important
exemptions on the creation of a board with a majority of independent
directors.72 The SEC then passed a rule requiring any fund relying on any of
its exemptive rules to have a board comprised of at least 75% independent
directors and further requiring that the chairman of the board be an
independent director. 73 This rule proved very controversial since
approximately 80% of investment companies had a board chairman who was
an officer of the fund's adviser. Two commissioners dissented from the
adoption of the rule, 74 and an action was instituted against the SEC for a
declaratory judgment declaring the rule invalid as beyond the SEC's75
statutory authority and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
The D.C. Circuit Court held that the rule was within the SEC's authority, but
invalidated the rule on the ground that the SEC had not conducted a proper
cost-benefit analysis of the impact of the rule.76 The SEC then hurriedly
included such an analysis, but the Court of Appeals again remanded the rulemaking to the SEC, based on Administrative Procedure Act violations.77 As
of yet, the SEC has been unable to adopt a final rule.78
70. Id.
71. Rule 17e-1, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17e-1 (2008). The other exemptive rules are 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.17a-8 (2008) (permitting mergers between certain affiliated funds); 17 C.F.R. §
270.15a-4(b)(2) (2008) (permitting boards to approve interim advisory contracts without
shareholder approval); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(d)(7) (2008) (permitting funds and their
affiliates to purchase joint liability insurance policies); 17 C.F.R. § 270. 17g-l(j) (2008)
(permitting funds to maintain joint insured bonds); 17 C.F.R. § 270.18f-3 (2008) (permitting
funds to issue multiple classes of voting stock); and 17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-3 (2008) (permitting
the operation of interval funds by enabling closed-end funds to repurchase their shares).
72. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Release No.
7932, Exchange Act Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,816, 66
Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001).
73. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520,
69 Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004).
74. Id. at 46,390-93 (Glassman and Atkins, Commissioners, dissenting).
75. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
76. Id. at 143-44.
77. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
78. The SEC has requested further comments on the issues raised but has not taken
action with respect to this rule-making. Investment Company Governance, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27,395, 88 SEC Docket 622 (June 13, 2006).
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Although the SEC has been very active in regulating investment
companies, it has allowed hedge funds and private equity funds to escape
registration under either the Investment Company Act or the Investment
Advisers Act. Hedge funds are investment vehicles that hold a pool of
securities, and perhaps other assets. Interests in hedge funds are not sold in a
registered public offering, and they are not registered as investment
companies under the Investment Company Act.79 The classic hedge funds
were formed for the purpose of hedging highly leveraged long positions by
utilizing short sales and put and call options. 80 Today's hedge funds engage
in a wider variety of investment strategies. Ever since hedge funds became
participants in the securities markets, in the 1950s, they have endeavored to
operate as unregulated entities and the SEC has been uncertain about how, if
at all, to regulate them. Most hedge funds in the United States are formed as
limited partnerships in order to obtain flow-through tax treatment. 81 Private
equity funds are also unregistered investment vehicles in which investors
pool money to invest in securities, but private equity funds typically are
longer-term investments. 82 Venture capital funds,
which provide seed money
83
to start up businesses, are structurally similar.
Although most hedge funds and private equity funds meet the definition
of an investment company as being "engaged primarily... in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities," 84 they fall within exceptions
to that definition either because their securities are owned by not more than
one hundred persons or their securities are owned "exclusively by persons
who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers,"
and they are not making or proposing to make a public offering of their
securities. 85 For this purpose, a "qualified purchaser" is86a natural person who
owns not less than $5,000,000 in investment securities.

79. STAFF REPORT, SEC. & EXCH.COMM'N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS 3 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter HEDGE FUND REPORT].
80. Ralph S. Janvey, Hedge Funds SEC. & COMM. REG. (STANDARD & POOR'S), June 8,

1988, at 91.
81. Id.Some overseas hedge funds are differently organized. See lain Cullen, Hedge
Funds: Stiructureand Documentation, in HEDGE FUNDS: LAW AND REGULATION (lain Cullen &

Helen Parry eds., 2000), at 1-4.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
(2008).

HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 79, at 7-8.

Id.
at 8.
Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(l)(A) (2000).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2000).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2000); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.2a51-l(h), .2a51-2
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Similarly, the manager of a hedge fund or private equity fund falls within
the definition of an investment advisor as "any person who, for
compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or
through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the
advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling securities ... ,87 However,
an exemption from registration as an investment adviser exists for the small
advisor who has had fewer than fifteen clients, does not hold himself out
generally to the public as an investment adviser nor act as an investment
adviser to any registered investment company. 88 The key to the long-time
exemption for hedge funds and other private investment funds doing
business as limited partnerships was that the managing partner was
considered to have only one client-the limited partnership. 89 This safe
harbor was adopted in 1985,90 but the SEC recently
attempted to eliminate it
9
by changing the definition of the term "client." '
Hedge funds have grown in number and with regard to assets under
management in recent years. In 1992, the SEC estimated that there were
approximately 400 hedge funds in existence. In 2003, it was estimated that
there were approximately 6,000 hedge funds operating in the United States
with approximately $600 billion of assets under management. 92 In 2004, the
SEC estimated that there were 7,000 hedge funds with approximately $870
billion of assets under management and these assets were approximately onefifth the amount of assets under management by registered investment
994
companies.9 3 The SEC has repeatedly studied hedge funds over the years, 94
87. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1) (2000).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2008). The safe harbor provided for in this rule would
also apply to private funds doing business as corporations, LLCs or trusts.
90. Definition of "Client" of an Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating to
Limited Partnerships, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 983, 50 Fed. Reg. 29,206 (July
18, 1985). The initial safe harbor was an effort to clarify that a general partner to a limited
partnership was advising the partnership and not the partners individually.
91. See infra notes 101, 111 and accompanying text.
92. HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 79, at I n.2.

93. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055-56 (Dec. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Hedge Fund Registration Rule]. In 2006, one reporter estimated that there were about 1,000
private equity firms and 6,000 hedge fund management firms, making it likely that the hedge
fund markets would overwhelm the smaller private equity market. Edwin A. Goodman,
Convergence Could Hurt: Hedge Funds Might Swallow PrivateEquity Market, PENSIONS AND
INVESTMENTS, July 10, 2006, available at http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/

article?AID=/200607 10/PRINTSUB/607100722/1026/TOC.
94. See Hedge Fund Registration Rule, supra note 93, at 72,055.
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but until recently did not make any attempt to bring them under the
regulatory umbrella of either the Investment Company Act or the Investment
Advisers Act. Among the reasons that hedge funds and other private
investment vehicles have been reluctant to register with the SEC is that their
managers typically charge a fee which is a percentage of profits, a practice
generally unavailable to registered investment advisers, 95 and they use
leverage to an extent prohibited by the Investment Company Act.96
Registered investment companies also have less flexibility with regard to
other investment strategies such as short selling. 97 In addition, hedge funds
avoid the artificial and cumbersome structure of having a pool of assets in
corporate form managed by an outside advisor.
The growth and size of the hedge fund and private equity market made
the SEC concerned about its continued failure to regulate these investment
vehicles in any way. Enforcement cases involving hedge funds made the
SEC worry that hedge funds were being marketed to investors who were not
sufficiently sophisticated to understand the risks they were taking. In
addition, the SEC was concerned about systemic risks caused by the way in
which hedge funds valued their portfolios.98 The SEC probably also was
concerned that its lack of regulatory authority over hedge funds imperiled its
regulation of investment companies and investment advisers. If such a large
proportion of managed pooled investments were occurring outside of the
SEC's jurisdiction, the SEC could become marginalized, and investors and
fund managers could begin to question why investment companies were so
heavily regulated. 99
Seeking to close the proverbial barn door after the horses ran away, the
SEC issued a rule requiring each shareholder or beneficiary of a private fund
(which would include all hedge funds, but curiously not private equity or

95. Id. at 72,060. The SEC did pass Rule 205-3 which allows a fee based on a

percentage of fund profits under certain circumstances, but the SEC generally disapproves of
such fees. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2008).
96. HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 79, at 37-39.
97. Id. at 39-43.
98. Id. at 76-87; see also Recent Developments in Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 32-39 (2003) (testimony of

William H. Donaldson, Chair., Sec, and Exch. Comm'n), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibingetdoc.cgi?dbname= 108_senate hearings&docid=f:92703.pdf.
99. In its Hedge Fund Report, the SEC staff rather timidly raised the issue of whether
hedge fund strategies might be able to be deployed by open end investment companies.
HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 79, at 106.
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venture capital funds)'0° to be considered a separate client in counting the
fifteen clients for an exemption under the Investment Advisers Act. 101 There
were two dissents to the promulgation of this rule,' 0 2 and the rule was struck
down by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Goldstein v. SEC.103
The SEC's policy justifications for its rule requiring formerly
unregulated hedge funds to register with the SEC were: the growth of hedge
funds; the growth in hedge fund fraud; and the growing exposure of smaller
investors, pensioners and other investors to hedge funds.' °4 Professor Troy
A. Paredes has suggested that political and psychological influences on the
SEC rather than serious changes in the operation of hedge funds led to the
hedge fund registration rule. 10 5 He notes that the SEC "did not want to get
caught flat-footed" as it was after the Enron and WorldCom scandals, and
that the SEC was worried about fraud on investors unable to truly fend for
themselves. 10 6 Another commentator suggested that the circumstances
surrounding the SEC's hedge fund registration rule were similar to the
circumstances leading to the SEC's efforts in the 1980s to require banks
engaging in securities activities to register with the SEC, an effort
invalidated by the D.C. Circuit.10 7 As was the case with that bank registration
rule, other federal financial regulators disagreed with the SEC's
determination
that it should increase its regulatory authority over hedge
10 8
funds.
100. This was accomplished through a definition that excluded funds which do not
permit its owners to redeem any portion of their ownership interests within two years of the
purchase of such interests. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(d) (2008) (definition of "private

fund").
101.
Hedge Fund Registration Rule, supra note 93, at 72,070 n.183.
102. Id. at 72,090-98 (Glassman and Atkins, Commissioners, dissenting).
103. 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
104. Hedge Fund Registration Rule, supra note 93, at 72,055-59.
105. Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 975 (2006).
106. Id. at 975-76.
107. Adam R. Bolter, Comment, Regulation of Hedge Fund Advisers: A Valid
Exercise of Rulemaking Authority or the Promulgationof New Law?, 57 ADMN. L. REv. 595,
606 n.64 (2005).
108. Id. at 615. Over half of the largest hedge funds are registered with the CFTC. See
Comment Letter from Richard M. Whiting, Executive Dir. of the Fin. Servs. Roundtable to the
Staff of the Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 15, 2004) at n.5; Comment Letter from Sheila C.
Bair, Professor, Univ. of Mass.-Amherst to the Staff of the Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 15,
2004); Sharon Brown-Hruska, Acting Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, Opening Statement Before the CPO and Commodity Pool Roundtable (April 6,
2005), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches05/opabrown-hruska-30.htm (claiming
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Registration by hedge funds under the Investment Advisers Act is
subject to a number of regulatory requirements: the filing of a Form ADV
disclosing the fund's business practices and information about fund
managers, the delivery of a basic information package to clients, the adoption
of procedures regarding proxy voting, the adoption of a code of ethics, the
development of a system of internal controls and compliance procedures, and
the appointment of a chief compliance officer.1°9 Despite these burdens,
many hedge funds had voluntarily registered with the SEC prior to the SEC's
adoption of its hedge fund registration rule. 110 The way in which the SEC
changed its regulations to require Investment Adviser Act registration by
hedge funds was by requiring investment advisers to count each owner of a
private fund towards the threshold of fourteen clients for purposes of
determining the private adviser exemption.'
"Qualified clients""knowledgeable employees" or "qualified purchasers"-did not have to be
counted, however." 2 The term "private fund" was defined to exclude funds
which do not permit investors to redeem their interests within two years of
purchase, a definition intended to exclude structured finance vehicles such as
private equity funds and venture capital funds from the registration
requirement.11 3 There was a strong dissent from the promulgation of this rule
by two commissioners on the grounds that there were viable alternatives to
the rule that were not considered, that the justifications for the rule did not
withstand 4 scrutiny, and that SEC resources would be unnecessarily
diverted."
The D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC's hedge fund registration rule on
the ground that it was an unreasonable interpretation of the term "client" in
the Investment Adviser's Act." 5 According to the court, the SEC "failed
adequately to justify departing from its own prior interpretation of §
203(b)(3)." ' 116 This decision left the SEC in the awkward position of being
uncertain of its authority to bring anti-fraud actions against advisers where
investors in a pool are defrauded by their adviser. Accordingly, the SEC
proposed two new rules-one to prohibit advisers to pooled investment
that commodity pool operators, sponsors and advisors registered with the CFTC should not
also have to register with the SEC).
109. Paredes, supra note 105, at 988-89.
110. HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 79, at 22 n.76.
111. Hedge Fund Registration Rule, supra note 93, at 72,070.
112. Id.at 72,070-71.
113. Id. at 72,074.
114.. Id. at 72,098-99 (Atkins and Glassman, Commissioners, dissenting).
115. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
116. Id. at 883.
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vehicles from making false or misleading statements or otherwise defrauding
investors, and a second to revise the definition of "accredited investor" as it
relates to natural persons.'7
With regard to fraud on participants in pooled investment vehicles, the
SEC proposed new Rule 206(4)-8 to apply to all investment advisers,
whether or not registered or required to be registered with the SEC. The rule
would prohibit advisors from making false or misleading statements or
otherwise defrauding8 investors and prospective investors in pooled
investment vehicles."1
Another proposed rule would change the definition of an "accredited
investor" in Regulation D, solely for the purpose of categorizing investors in
private investment vehicles" 9 to mean any natural person who meets either
the net worth or income requirements for the private placement exemption
but in addition, owns, individually, or jointly with the person's spouse, not
less than $2.5 million in investments at the time of purchase of securities
issued by private investment vehicles under Regulation D or section 4(6).
Residential real estate would be excluded from the definition of investments.
Further, the $2.5 million requirement would be adjusted every five years for
of an accredited investor would not
inflation. 20 This proposed new definition
21
funds.'
capital
venture
to
be applicable
In February 2007 the President's Working Group on Financial Markets,
comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairs of the Federal
Reserve Board, the SEC and the CFTC rejected more oversight of hedge
funds, and instead agreed to principles and guidelines with respect to private
pools of capital. These principles, which essentially say that investors should
not take excessive risks and should carefully evaluate the strategies and
management skills of hedge funds in which they invest, would not prevent
the SEC's proposed rules from becoming effective. 12 2 Nevertheless, the
thrust of this agreement is generally anti-regulatory, and both the American
Bar Association Federal Regulation of Securities Committee and the New
York State Bar Association Committee on Securities Regulation filed
117. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 8766,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2576, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (Jan. 4, 2007).
118. Id. at401-03.
119. Id. at 414. Private investment vehicles are, essentially, unregistered investment
companies.
120. Id. at 405.
121. Id. at 407-08.
122. See Stephen Labaton, Officials Reject More Oversight of Hedge Funds, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 23, 2007, at Al.
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comments in response to proposed Rules 509 and 216 suggesting that the
SEC might not have adequate authority for the breadth of the rules and also
123
suggesting that the new accredited investor definition is overly exclusive.
Particularly troublesome to commenters is a failure to grandfather investors
who are already partners in hedge funds, but who do not meet the new
accredited investor definition.
Whether the SEC's proposals will become final, or what form they will
take if they do become final, is unknown at this time. But these new rule
proposals exemplify the SEC's penchant for regulating by exemption.
Having decided that many investors who now are able to become partners or
other participants in hedge funds should be precluded from doing so, the
SEC might now accomplish this goal by generating yet another accredited
investor rule. Even if the SEC's objectives are laudable, is this a sound
regulatory strategy?
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem with regulating by exemption is that it does not incentivize
the SEC to adjust regulations that discourage capital market participants
from entering a regulated system. Instead of reforming the registration
provisions of the Securities Act to make such registration more user-friendly
and less likely to result in after-the-fact lawsuits, the SEC fashioned private
placement exemptions that have created a huge market for unregistered
offerings. Instead of trying to reform the Investment Company Act and the
Advisers Act to accommodate hedge funds and private equity funds, the SEC
exempted them for many years, and then, becoming worried that a large part
of the capital market had moved beyond its jurisdiction, tried to recapture
jurisdiction over these investment pools.
One of the reasons that issuers prefer private offerings to registered
offerings is that liability is based on Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
instead of the virtually strict liability of Section 11 of the Securities Act.
Further, foreign issuers prefer Rule 144A offerings to registered offerings
because they are not then compelled to become registered and reporting
companies under the Exchange Act. But perhaps better, and certainly less
complex, regulation would flow from efforts to make the registration
123. Comment Letter from Keith F. Higgins, Chair, Am. Bar Ass'n, Section of Bus.
Law, Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec. to the Staff of the Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 12,
2007); Comment Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, Chair, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Bus. Law
Section, Comm. on Sec. Regulation to the Staff of the Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 14, 2007).
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provisions easier to use and the Securities Act liability provisions less
onerous and more suited to today's fast paced markets.
Similarly, if hedge funds are a threat to investors, why did the SEC allow
them to remain exempt for so long and then attempt to exert jurisdiction over
them through a controversial rule that was not upheld? Whether the SEC's
new rule-making proposal will fare any better is unclear. The SEC's problem
is that it has not made a good case for why it needs to take regulatory
jurisdiction over hedge funds, having declined to do so for over fifty years.
Although hedge funds may pose systemic risks to the market, other financial
regulators with more direct responsibility for the stability of financial
institutions need to be persuaded that improving investor protection for
hedge fund investors is a solution to this threat.
The SEC has long been very clever at using its power to define terms to
fill gaps or solve problems in the securities laws, but as the court pointed out
in Goldstein, such an effort must be reasonable. In the case of dealing with
the concept of the accredited investor perhaps the SEC has been too clever
and not sufficiently coherent in defining its objectives and thinking through
the consequences of its rule-making.

